

COORDINATING HUMAN AND AGENT BEHAVIOR IN COLLECTIVE-RISK SCENARIOS

Elias Fernández Domingos^{1,2,3}, Juan Carlos Burguillo³, Ann Nowé² and Tom Lenaerts^{1,2}

¹ AI lab, Computer Science Department, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

² MLG, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

³ Department of Telematic Engineering. University of Vigo, Spain

MOTIVATION OF THE WORK


How do humans behave when collective-risk is involved?

Solving the climate change requires the cooperation of several countries with different ideologies, customs, and economical perspectives for their industries, which are in many cases still very dependent on fossil energy.


Measures that need to be taken will have a high impact on industrialized countries as well as the so-called new economies. However, if the transition to renewable sources of energy keeps being postponed, the consequences are most certainly terrible. **This situation has been operationalized in Game Theory as the Collective-Risk Game [1].**

Our ultimate goal is to apply the scientific and technological development that we produce to **hybrid-technological systems** (e.g., P2P energy markets) where **humans have to interact with artificial agents** and **agents have to negotiate among themselves** taking into account human's preferences and utilities [2].

In the **Collective-Risk Game**, players are requested to achieve a common target under the risk of losing all their money otherwise



ANTICIPATORY AGENTS ARE ABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR CHANGES IN THE CONTEXT OF GAMES



We were able to show that anticipatory models represent better the data from behavioral experiments than reactive ones [3]. Moreover, **anticipatory agents** developed the ability to predict and identify changes in the context (w in the figure) of the game, which allowed them to optimize their behavior to each situation. This is very relevant as it is a characteristic present in the participants of our experiments and that other models failed to capture. Such results led the path to our current work, where we analyze the learning, evolutionary and collective dynamics of different types of agents. **We will soon submit our progress in this matter in two parts, to a conference and a journal.**

RESEARCH PLAN & NEXT YEAR PLANNING

		WP1			WP2		WP3			WP4		WP5	
		M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M1	M2
1st Year	OD15												
	JM16												
	AJ16												
	JS16												
2nd Year	OD16												
	JM17												
	AJ17												
3rd Year	JS17												
	OD17												
	JM18												
	AJ18												
4th Year	JS18												
	OD18												
	JM19												
	AJ19												
		JS19											

Next Year Planning

What is known?

What is missing?

Experiments

Perception of Risk



Cooperation

Summary statistics


Can we infer the behavior directly from data?



How can we influence participants?

AI models


Analytical models with hypothetical behaviors of limited complexity.




Create models of human behavior that take into account their inherent cognitive capacities

THESIS OBJECTIVES


Generate policies to guide human behavior



Can we infer human behavior?



Can we model human behavior?



BEEL: +700 participants on database. Managed by ORSEE System



WP1-M1: Design of the experiments.

WP1-M2: Design and implement a specific framework required to perform the experiments.

WP1-M3: Perform the experiments and collect the data.

WP2-M1: Search for behavioral models in the data.

WP2-M2: Evaluate whether the inferred models lead to the observed macroscopic behavior.

WP3-M1: Experiment with previous approaches from the literature.

WP3-M2: Create new models to explain the data.

WP3-M3: Compare the behavior of different models.

WP4-M1: Multi-agent simulations.

WP4-M2: Search mechanisms and policies to influence behavior.

WP5-M1: Identify applications of our research to real-world problems.

WP5-M2: Write the PhD thesis.

[1] Milinski, M.; Sommerfeld, R. D.; Krambeck, H.-J.; Reed, F. a.; and Marotzke, J. 2008. The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 105(7):2291–2294.

[2] Fernández Domingos, E.; Burguillo, J.C.; Nowé, A.; and Lenaerts, T. 2017. Coordinating Human and Agent Behavior in Collective-Risk Scenarios. In *Proceedings of the thirty-first AAAI conference*, AAAI.

[3] Fernández Domingos, E.; Burguillo, J. C.; and Lenaerts, T. 2017. Reactive versus anticipative decision making in a novel gift-giving game. In *Proceedings of the thirty-first AAAI conference*, AAAI.

